We study positional voting rules when candidates and voters are embedded in a common metric space, and cardinal preferences are naturally given by distances in the metric space. In a positional voting rule, each candidate receives a score from each ballot based on the ballot's rank order; the candidate with the highest total score wins the election. The cost of a candidate is his sum of distances to all voters, and the distortion of an election is the ratio between the cost of the elected candidate and the cost of the optimum candidate. We consider the case when candidates are representative of the population, in the sense that they are drawn i.i.d. from the population of the voters, and analyze the expected distortion of positional voting rules.
Introduction
In light of the classic impossibility results for axiomatic approaches to social choice [4] and voting [18, 28] , a fruitful approach has been to treat voting as an implicit optimization problem of finding the "best" candidate for the population in aggregate [9, 11, 24, 25] . Using this approach, voting systems can be compared based on how much they distort the outcome, in the sense of leading to the election of suboptimal candidates. A particularly natural optimization objective is the sum of distances between voters and the chosen candidate in a suitable metric space [1, 2, 3, 19] . The underlying assumption is that the closer a candidate is to a voter, the more similar their positions on key questions are. Because proximity implies that the voter would benefit from the candidate's election, voters will rank candidates by increasing distance, a model known as singlepeaked preferences [7, 15, 8, 23, 22, 6, 27, 5] .
Even in the absence of strategic voting, voting systems can lead to high distortion in this setting, because they typically allow only for communication of ordinal preferences 1 , i.e., rankings of candidates [10] . In a beautiful piece of recent work, Anshelevich et al. [2] showed that this approach can draw very clear distinctions between voting systems: some voting systems (in particular, Copeland and related systems) have distortion bounded by a small constant, while most others (including Plurality, Veto, k-approval, and Borda Count) have unbounded distortion, growing linearly in the number of voters or candidates. The examples giving bad distortion typically have the property that the candidates are not "representative" of the voters. Anshelevich et al. [2] show more positive results when there are no near-ties for first place in any voter's ranking. Cheng et al. [12] propose instead a model of representativeness in which the candidates are drawn randomly from the population of voters; under this model, they show smaller constant distortion bounds than the worst-case bounds for majority voting with n = 2 candidates. Cheng et al. [12] left as an open question the analysis of the distortion of voting systems for n ≥ 3 representative candidates.
In the present work, we study the distortion of positional voting systems with n ≥ 3 representative candidates. Informally (formal definitions of all concepts are given in Section 2), a positional voting system is one in which each voter writes down an ordering of candidates, and the system assigns a score to each candidate based solely on his 2 position in the voter's ordering. The map from positions to scores is known as the scoring rule of the voting system, and for n candidates is a function g n : {0, . . . , n − 1} → R ≥0 . The total score of a candidate is the sum of scores he obtains from all voters, and the winner is the candidate with maximum total score. The most well-known explicitly positional voting system is Borda Count [13] , in which g n (i) = n − i for all i. Many other systems are naturally cast in this framework, including Plurality (in which voters give 1 point to their first choice only) and Veto (in which voters give 1 point to all but their last choice).
In analyzing positional voting systems, we assume that voters are not strategic, i.e., they report their true ranking of candidates based on proximity in the metric space. This is in keeping with the line of work on analyzing the distortion of social choice functions, and avoids issues of gametheoretic modeling and equilibrium existence or selection (see, e.g., [16] ) which are not our focus.
As our main contribution, we characterize when a positional voting system is guaranteed to have constant distortion, regardless of the underlying metric space of voters and candidates, and regardless of the number n of candidates that are drawn from the voter distribution. The characterization relies almost entirely on the "limit voting system." By normalizing both the scores and the candidate index to lie in [0, 1] (we associate the i th out of n candidates with his quantile i n−1 ∈ [0, 1]), we can take a suitable limit g of the scoring functions g n as n → ∞.
Our main result (Corollary 3.2 in Section 3) states the following: (1) If g is not constant on the open interval (0, 1), then the voting system has constant distortion. (2) If g is a constant other than 1 on the open interval (0, 1), then the voting system does not have constant distortion. The only remaining case is when g ≡ 1 on (0, 1). In that case, the rate of convergence of g n to g matters, and a precise characterization is given by Theorem 3.1.
As direct applications of our main result, we obtain that Borda Count and k-approval for k = Θ(n) representative candidates have constant distortion; on the other hand, Plurality, Veto, the Nauru Dowdall method (see Section 2), and k-approval for k = O(1) have super-constant 1 Of course, it is also highly questionable that voters would be able to quantify distances in a metric space sufficiently accurately, in particular given that the metric space is primarily a modeling tool rather than an actual concrete object.
2 For consistency, we always use male pronouns for candidates and female pronouns for voters.
distortion. In fact, it is easy to adapt the proof of Theorem 3.1 to show that the distortion of Plurality, Veto, and O(1)-approval, even with representative candidates, is Ω(n). Our results provide interesting contrasts to the results of Anshelevich et al. [2] . Under adversarial candidates, all of the above-mentioned voting rules have distortion Ω(n); the focus on representative candidates allowed us to distinguish the performance of Borda Count and Θ(n)-approval from that of the other voting systems. Thus, an analysis in terms of representative candidates allows us to draw distinctions between voting systems which in a worst-case setting seem to be equally bad.
As a by-product of the proof of our main theorem, in Lemma 3.3, we show that every voting system (positional or otherwise) has distortion O(n) with representative candidates. Combined with the lower bound alluded to above, this exactly pins down the distortion of Plurality, Veto, and O(1)-approval with representative candidates to Θ(n). For Veto, this result also contrasts with the worst-case bound of Anshelevich et al. [2] , which showed that the distortion can grow unboundedly even for n = 3 candidates.
Preliminaries

Voters, Metric Space, and Preferences
The voters/candidates are embedded in a closed metric space (Ω, d), where d ω,ω ′ is the distance between points ω, ω ′ ∈ Ω. The distance captures the dissimilarity in opinions between voters (and candidates) -the closer two voters or candidates are, the more similar they are. The distribution of voters in Ω is denoted by the (measurable) density function q ω . We allow for q to have point masses. 3 Unless there is no risk of confusion, we will be careful to distinguish between a location ω ∈ Ω and a specific voter j or candidate i at that location. We apply d equally to locations/voters/candidates.
We frequently use the standard notion of a ball B(ω, r) := {ω ′ | d ω,ω ′ ≤ r} in a metric space. For balls (and other sets) B, we write q B := ω∈B q ω dω.
An election is run between n ≥ 2 candidates according to rules defined in Section 2.3. The n candidates are assumed to be representative of the population, in the sense that their locations are drawn i.i.d. from the distribution q of voters.
Each voter ranks the n candidates i by non-decreasing distance from herself in (Ω, d). Ties are broken arbitrarily, but consistently 4 , meaning that all voters at the same location have the same ranking. We denote the ranking of a voter j or a location ω over candidates i by π j (i) or π ω (i). The distance-based ranking assumption means that
As mentioned in the introduction, we assume that voters are not strategic; i.e., they express their true ranking of candidates based on proximity in the metric space.
Social Cost and Distortion
Candidates are "better" if they are closer to voters on average. The social cost of a candidate (or location) i is
The socially optimal candidate among the set C of candidates running is denoted by o(C) := argmin i∈C c i . The overall optimal location is denoted by o ∈ argmin ω∈Ω c ω , which is any 1-median of the metric space. (If there are multiple optimal locations, consider one of them fixed arbitrarily.) The argmin always exists, because the metric space is assumed to be closed, and the cost function is continuous and bounded below by 0. Note that it is not necessary that there be any voters located at o.
Based on the votes, a voting system will determine a winner w(C) for the set C of candidates, who will often be different from o(C). The distortion measures how much worse the winner is than the optimum
We are interested in the expected distortion of positional voting systems under i.i.d. random candidates, i.e.,
Our distortion bounds are achieved by lower-bounding c o(C) ≥ c o . A particularly useful quantity in this context is the fraction of voters outside a ball of radius r around o, which we denote by H(r) := 1 − q B( o,r) . The following lemma captures some useful simple facts that we use: Lemma 2.1.
1. For any candidate or location i,
2. The cost of any candidate or location i can be written as
3. For all r ≥ 0, the cost of the optimum location o is lower-bounded by
Proof.
1. The proof of the first inequality simply applies the triangle inequality under the integral:
For the second equation, observe that
, and the expectation of any nonnegative random variable X can be rewritten as
3. For the third inequality, we apply the previous part with i = o, and lower bound
Positional Voting Systems and Scoring Rules
We are interested in positional voting systems. Such systems are based on scoring rules: voters give a ranking of candidates, and with each position is associated a score.
Definition 2.1 (Scoring Rule). A scoring rule for n candidates is a non-increasing function g n : {0, . . . , n − 1} → [0, 1] with g n (0) = 1 and g n (n − 1) = 0.
Definition 2.2 (Positional Voting System).
A positional voting system is a sequence of scoring rules g n , one for each number of candidates n = 1, 2, . . ..
The interpretation of g n is that if voter j puts a candidate i in position π j (i) on her ballot, then i obtains g n (π j (i)) points from j. The total score of candidate i is then
The winning candidate is one with highest total score, i.e., for a set C of n candidates, w(C) ∈ argmax i∈C σ(i); again, ties are broken arbitrarily, and our results do not depend on tie breaking.
The restriction to monotone non-increasing scoring rules is standard when studying positional voting systems. One justification is that in any positional voting system violating this restriction, truth-telling is a dominated strategy, rendering such a system uninteresting for most practical purposes. Given this restriction, the assumption that g n (0) = 1 and g n (n − 1) = 0 is without loss of generality, because a score-based rule is invariant under affine transformations.
Next, we want to capture the notion that a positional voting system is "consistent" as we vary the number of candidates n. Intuitively, we want to exclude contrived voting systems such as "If the number of candidates is even, then use Borda Count; otherwise use Plurality voting." This is captured by the following definition.
Definition 2.3 (Consistency)
. Let V be a positional voting system with scoring rules {g n | n ∈ N}. We say that V is consistent if there exists a function g :
+ ǫ for all n ≥ n 0 . We call g the limit scoring rule of V.
Intuitively, this definition says that the sequence of scoring rules g n is consistent with a single scoring rule g in the limit. Using the fact that g n is monotone non-increasing for each n, it can be shown that g is also monotone non-increasing. We note that g n converges pointwise to g in a precise and natural sense. Formally, when x ∈ [0, 1] is rational, there exists an infinite sequence of integers n with ⌊x(n − 1)⌋ = ⌈x(n − 1)⌉ = x(n − 1), and consistency implies that g(x) must equal the limit of g n (x(n − 1)) for that sequence of values of n. Therefore the limit scoring rule g is uniquely defined if it exists.
All positional voting systems we are aware of are consistent according to Definition 2.3.
Example 2.1. To illustrate the notion of a consistent positional voting system, consider the following examples, encompassing most well-known scoring rules.
• In Plurality voting with n candidates, g n (0) = 1 and g n (k) = 0 for all k > 0. The limit scoring rule is g(0) = 1 and g(x) = 0 for all x > 0.
• In Veto voting with n candidates, g n (k) = 1 for all k < n − 1 and g n (n − 1) = 0. The limit scoring rule is g(x) = 1 for all x < 1 and g(1) = 0.
• In k-approval voting with constant k, we have
, and g n (k ′ ) = 0 for all other k ′ . The limit scoring rule is g(0) = 1 and g(x) = 0 for all x > 0, i.e., the same as for Plurality voting. (This relies on k being constant, or more generally,
• In k-approval voting with linear k, there exists a constant γ ∈ (0, 1) with g n (k) = 1 for all k ≤ γn, and g n (k) = 0 for all larger k. The limit scoring rule is g(x) = 1 for x ≤ γ and g(x) = 0 for x > γ.
• The Borda voting rule has g n (k) = 1 − k n−1 (after normalization). The limit scoring rule is g(x) = 1 − x.
• The Dowdall method used in Nauru [17, 26] has g n (k) = 1/(k + 1). After normalization, the rule becomes g n (k) = 1 n−1 · ( n k+1 − 1). The limit scoring rule is g(0) = 1 and g(x) = 0 for all x > 0, i.e., the same as for Plurality voting. This is because for every constant quantile x, the score of the candidate at x is
The Main Characterization Result
In this section, we state and prove our main theorem, characterizing positional voting systems with constant distortion. Theorem 3.1. Let V be a positional voting system with a sequence g n of scoring rules for n = 1, 2, . . .. Then, V has constant expected distortion if and only if there exist constants n 0 and y ∈ (0, 1) such that for all n ≥ n 0 ,
We prove Theorem 3.1 in Sections 3.1 (sufficiency) and 3.2 (necessity). Condition (4) is quite unwieldy. In most cases of practical interest, we can use Corollary 3.2.
Corollary 3.2. Let V be a consistent positional voting system with limit scoring rule g. Corollary 3.2 is proved in Section 4. The constant in Theorem 3.1 and Corollary 3.2 depends on V, but not on the metric space or the number of candidates. Corollary 3.2 has the advantage of determining constant expected distortion only based on the limit scoring rule g. The only case when it does not apply is when g(x) = 1 for all x ∈ [0, 1). In that case, the higher complexity of Theorem 3.1 is indeed necessary to determine whether V has constant distortion. Fortunately, Veto voting is the only rule of practical importance for which g(x) ≡ 1 on [0, 1), and it is easily analyzed.
Before presenting the proofs, we apply the characterization to the positional voting systems from Example 2.1. Using the limit scoring rules derived in Example 2.1, Corollary 3.2 implies constant expected distortion for Borda Count and k-approval with linear k = Θ(n), and super-constant expected distortion for Plurality, k-approval with k = o(n), and the Dowdall method.
This leaves Veto voting, for which it is easy to apply Theorem 3.1 directly. Because g n (k) = 1 for all k < n − 1, for any constant y < 1 and large enough n, the left-hand side of (4) is 0, while the right-hand side is positive. Hence, (4) can never be satisfied for sufficiently large n, implying super-constant expected distortion. The proof easily generalizes to show that when voters can veto o(n) candidates, the distortion is super-constant.
Sufficiency
In this section, we prove that condition (4) suffices for constant distortion. First, because of the monotonicity of g n , if (4) holds for y ∈ (0, 1), then it also holds for all y ′ ∈ [y, 1). Now, the highlevel idea of the proof is the following: we define a radius r large enough so that the ball B( o, r) around the socially optimal location o contains a very large (but still constant) fraction y of all voters, such that y satisfies (4) . If the number of candidates n is large enough (a large constant), standard Chernoff bounds ensure that as r ≥ r grows large, most candidates who are running will be from inside B( o, r). In turn, if many candidates inside B( o, r) are running, all candidates outside B( o, 3r) are very far down on almost everyone's ballot, and therefore cannot win. In particular, Inequality (4) implies that the total score of an average candidate in B( o, r) exceeds the maximum possible total score of a candidate outside B( o, 3r). This allows us to bound the expected distortion in terms of the cost of o.
The case of small n is much easier, since we can treat n as a constant. In that case, the following lemma is sufficient. Lemma 3.3. If n candidates are drawn i.i.d. at random from q, the expected distortion is at most n + 1.
Proof. The proof illustrates some of the key ideas that will be used later in the more technical proof for a large number of candidates. We want to bound
In order for a candidate at distance at least r from o to win, it is necessary that at least one such candidate be running. By a union bound over the n candidates, the probability of this event
Lower-bounding the cost of the optimum candidate from C in terms of the overall best location o, the expected distortion is
In preparation for the case of large n, we begin with the following technical lemma, which shows that whenever (4) holds, it will also hold when the terms on the left-hand side are "shifted," and the right-hand side can be increased by a factor of 2 (or, for that matter, any constant factor).
We now flesh out the details of the construction. By Lemma 3.4, there exists z 0 ∈ ( Consider any r ≥ r and write T := B( o, 3r) and S := B( o, r), as depicted in Figure 1 . When n candidates are drawn i.i.d. from q, the expected fraction of candidates drawn from outside of S is exactly H(r) ≤ 1 − µ. Let E r be the event that more than (1 − z)n candidates are from outside S. Lemma 3.5 uses Chernoff bounds and the definitions of the parameters to show that E r happens with sufficiently small probability; Lemma 3.6 then shows that unless E r happens, the distortion is constant.
Proof. By the Chernoff bound Pr
, applied with E [Z] = H(r) · n and δ = 1−z H(r) − 1 > 0, the probability of E r is at most
Recall that µ := (1 − 1−z ≤ 1, so the probability can be upper-bounded by making the exponent (1 − z) · n as small as possible. Because n ≥ n ≥ 1 1−z , the exponent is lower-bounded by 1. Thus, we obtain that the probability of E r is at most , r) . Most of the voters are in S. Lemma 3.6 states that whenever most of the candidates are from T , the winner must come from T . The reason is that for any i / ∈ T , even an average candidate in S beats i; in particular, the best candidate from S must beat i. Lemma 3.6. Whenever E r does not happen, the winner of the election is from B( o, 3r).
Proof. Let Z := ⌈z · (n − 1)⌉. Assume that exactly s ≥ Z out of the n candidates are drawn from S. Consider a candidate i / ∈ T . We will compare the average number of points of candidates in S with the maximum possible number of points of candidate i, and show that the former exceeds the latter.
• Each voter j / ∈ S gives at most one point to i. On the other hand, even if j ranks all of S in the last s positions, the total number of points assigned by j to S is at least n−1 k=n−s g n (k). The difference between the number of votes to i and the average number of votes to candidates in S is thus at most
Because no more than a 1 − µ fraction of voters are strictly outside S, the total advantage of i over an average candidate in S resulting from such voters is at most
• Each voter j ∈ S will rank all candidates in S (who are at distance at most 2r from her) ahead of all candidates outside T (who are at distance strictly more than 3r − r = 2r from her).
Let m ≥ 0 be such that j ranks i in position s + m. Then, i gets g n (s + m) points from j. Because j ranks all of S ahead of i, she gives at least s−1 k=0 g n (k + m) points in total to S. Hence, the difference in the number of points that j gives to an average candidate in S and the number of votes that j gives to i is at least
Because at least a µ fraction of voters are in S, the total advantage of an average candidate in S resulting from voters in B is at least
We show that ∆ S > ∆ i , using condition (5). Because g n is monotone non-increasing, and because s ≥ Z, we get that
Because z > 1 2 and g n is monotone, we get that
We now wrap up the sufficiency portion of the proof of Theorem 3.1. We distinguish two cases, based on the number of candidates n. If n < n, then Lemma 3.3 implies an upper bound of n + 1 ≤ n ≤ max(n 0 , 1 1−z ) = O(1) on the expected distortion. Now assume that n ≥ n. Recall that r := inf{r | q B( o,r) ≥ y}. By Lemmas 3.5 and 3.6, for any r ≥ r, the probability that the election's winner is outside B( o, 3r) is at most e 1−z · H(r). The rest of the proof is similar to that of Lemma 3.3. We again use that
and bound 
To upper-bound r, recall that at least a 1 − µ fraction of voters are outside of B( o, r) or on the boundary. Therefore, by Inequality (3), c o ≥ r · (1 − µ). Substituting this bound, the expected cost of the winning candidate is at most
as y depends only on the voting system V, but not on the metric space or the number of candidates. This completes the proof of sufficiency.
Proof of Lemma 3.4
Proof of Lemma 3.4. Because condition (4) holds for all y ′ > y, we may assume that y ≥ , and consider any z ≥ z 0 . Fix n ≥ n 0 , and write Y := ⌈y(n − 1)⌉ and Z := ⌈z(n − 1)⌉. Let m ≤ (1 − z)(n − 1) be arbitrary. We define
By monotonicity of g n ,
By condition (4) and monotonicity of g n , and because y ≥ 
To upper-bound S 1 in terms of S 3 , we show that the contribution of S 2 to the preceding sum is small, and upper-bound S 2 in terms of S 1 + S 3 . Because S 2 ≤ (1 − z)(n − 1) · (1 − g n (Y )), using the monotonicity of g n , we can write
Combining the preceding inequalities, we now obtain that
Solving for S 1 , and using that the definition of z 0 ensures 1 − z ≤ 1−y 6 , we now bound
completing the proof.
Necessity
Next, we prove that the condition in Theorem 3.1 is also necessary for constant distortion. We assume that the condition (4) does not hold, i.e., for every y ∈ (0, 1) and n 0 , there exists an n ≥ n 0 such that
We will show that the distortion of V is not bounded by any constant. The high-level idea of the construction is as follows: we define two tightly knit clusters A and B that are far away from each other. A contains a large α fraction of the population, and thus should in an optimal solution be the one that the winner is chosen from. We will ensure that with probability at least 1 2 , the winner instead comes from B. Because B is far from A, most of the population then is far from the chosen candidate, giving much worse cost than optimal.
The metrics underlying A and B are as follows: B will essentially provide an "ordering," meaning that whichever set of candidates is drawn from B, all voters in B (and essentially all in A) agree on their ordering of the candidates. This will ensure that one candidate from B will get a sufficiently large fraction of first-place votes, and will be ranked highly enough by voters from A, too. A will be based on a large number M of discrete locations ω. Their pairwise distances are chosen i.i.d.: as a result, the rankings of voters are uniformly random, and there is no consensus among voters in A on which of their candidates they prefer. Because the vote is thus split, the best candidate from B will win instead.
The following parameters (whose values are chosen with foresight) will be used to define the metric space.
• Let c > 1 be any constant; we will construct a metric space and number of candidates for which the distortion is at least c.
• Let β ∈ (0, • Let α = 1 − β denote the fraction of voters in the large cluster A.
• Let s = 1+β β be the distance between the clusters B and A. (Each cluster will have diameter at most 2.) (1 − α) ; such an α exists because the left-hand side goes to 0 as α → 1. α < 1 is a high-probability upper bound on the fraction of candidates that will be drawn from A.
• Let n 0 = 4 β 2 > 16; this is a lower bound on the number of candidates that ensures that the actual fraction of candidates drawn from A is at most α with sufficiently high probability.
• Let n ≥ n 0 be the n whose existence is guaranteed by the assumption (6) (for y = α and n 0 ).
• Let M = n 3 ; this is the number of discrete locations ω we construct within the larger cluster A.
We now formally define the metric space consisting of two clusters:
Definition 3.1. The metric space consists of two clusters A and B. A has M discrete locations, and q has a point mass of α M on each such location. The total probability mass on B is q B = 1 − α, distributed uniformly over the interval [1, 2] . Locations in B are identified by x ∈ [1, 2] . The distances are defined as follows:
1. For each distinct pair ω, ω ′ ∈ A, the distance d ω,ω ′ is drawn independently uniformly at random from [1, 2] .
2. For each distinct pair x, x ′ ∈ B of locations, the distance is defined to be d x,x ′ := min(x, x ′ ).
3. Partition B = [1, 2] into M ! disjoint intervals I π of length 1/M ! each, one for each permutation of the M locations in A. For ω ∈ A and x ∈ I π , let π −1 (ω) be the position of ω in π, and define the distance between ω and x to be d ω,x = s +
Proposition 3.7. Definition 3.1 defines a metric.
Proof. Non-negativity, symmetry, and indiscernibles hold by definition. Because all distances within clusters are in [1, 2] , and distances across clusters are more than 2, the triangle inequality holds for all pairs ω, ω ′ ∈ A and all pairs x, x ′ ∈ B.
Because d ω,x ∈ [s, s + 1] for all ω ∈ A and x ∈ B, and distances within A or B are at least 1, there can be no shorter path than the direct one between any ω ∈ A and x ∈ B. Therefore, the triangle inequality is satisfied. Now consider a (random) set C of n candidates, drawn i.i.d. from q. We are interested in the event that the resulting slate of candidates is highly representative of the voters, in the following sense.
Definition 3.2. Let C be the (random) set of n candidates drawn from q. Let E be defined as the conjunction of the following:
1. For each location ω ∈ A, the set C contains at most one candidate from ω.
2. At least a β 2 fraction of candidates in C is drawn from B (and thus at most an α fraction of candidates are from A).
At least an
Lemma 3.8 uses standard tail bounds to show that E happens with probability at least 1 2 ; then, Lemma 3.9 shows that whenever E happens, the winner is from B.
Lemma 3.8. E happens with probability at least Proof. We upper-bound the probability of the complement of each of the four constituent subevents.
1. For each of the at most n 2 pairs of candidates, the probability that they are both drawn from the same location is at most α/M ≤ 1/n 3 . By a union bound over all pairs, the probability that any location has at least two pairs is at most 1/n.
2. Let the random variable X be the number of candidates drawn from B. Then, E [X] = β · n, and X is a sum of i.i.d. Bernoulli random variables. By the Hoeffding bound Pr[X < (β − ǫ)n] ≤ exp(−2ǫ 2 n), with ǫ = β/2, we obtain that the fraction of candidates from B is too small with probability at most exp(
The proof is essentially identical to the previous case (except because α ≥ β, the bounds are even stronger), so this event happens with probability at least For any of the (M −1)!−1 intervals I, the probability that a specific pair of candidates is drawn from I is at most 4 ((M −1)!) 2 . By a union bound over all (at most n 2 ) pairs of candidates and all intervals, the probability that any pair is drawn from any interval I is at most
Because n ≥ 9, a union bound shows that E happens with probability at least Lemma 3.9. Whenever E happens, the winning candidate is from B.
Proof. Let b be the actual number of candidates drawn from B, and a = n − b the number of candidates drawn from A. Because we assumed that E happened, b ≥ β 2 · n and a ≤ α · n. Let C A be the set of candidates drawn from A. Under E, C A contains at most one candidate from each location ω ∈ A. As a result, because the random distances within A are distinct with probability 1, there will be no ties in the rankings of any voters.
Let ı be the candidate from B with smallest value x. With probability 1, the x value of ı is unique. Consider some arbitrary candidate i ∈ C A from location ω ′ . We calculate the contributions to ı and i from voters in B and in A separately, and show that ı beats i. Because this holds for arbitrary i, the candidate ı or another candidate from B wins.
1. We begin with points given out by voters in B. By definition of the distances within B, ı is ranked first by all voters in B.
Voters in I π rank the candidates from A according to their order in π. For each ordering of C A , exactly a 1 a! fraction of permutations induces that ordering. In particular, for each k ∈ 1, . . . , a, exactly a 1/a fraction of voters places i in position k + b. Thus, i obtains a total of (1 − α) · n−1 k=n−a 1 a · g n (k) points from voters in B. Overall, ı obtains an advantage of at least
2. Next, we analyze the number of points given out by voters in A. The distance from any voter location ω ∈ A to ı is at most s + x 4 + n M ! . Under E, no other candidate from B can be at a location x ≤ x + 1 (M −1)! ; therefore, the distance from any voter location ω ∈ A to any other candidate x ∈ B is at least
so all voters in A prefer ı over any other candidate from B. Hence, ı obtains at least α · g n (a) points combined from voters in A.
To analyze the votes from voters in A for candidates from A, we first notice that E and the draw of candidates are independent of the distances within A. Hence, even conditioned on E, the distances d ω,ω ′ between locations in A are i.i.d. uniform from [1, 2] . In particular, each location ω ∈ A ranks the candidates in C A in uniformly random order. Furthermore, for two locations ω = ω ′ , the rankings of C A are independent; the reason is that they are based on disjoint vectors of distances (d ω,i ) i∈C A , (d ω ′ ,i ) i∈C A . We use this independence to apply tail bounds. Let ω ′ be the location of i. Voters rank i as follows:
• Among locations ω without a candidate of their own, in expectation, a 1/a fraction of voters will rank i in position k, for each k = 0, . . . , a − 1.
• Among the a − 1 locations ω = ω ′ with a candidate of their own, in expectation, a 1/(a − 1) fraction of voters will rank i in position k, for each k = 1, . . . , a − 1.
• Voters at ω ′ will rank i in position 0.
For each k, let the random variable X k be the number of locations that rank i in position k. By the preceding arguments,
, and X k is a sum of M independent (not i.i.d.) Bernoulli random variables. Hence, by the Hoeffding bound, the probability that more than a 2 a fraction of voters rank i in position k is at most 2 exp(−2 · 1 a 2 · M ) ≤ 2 exp(−n). By a union bound over all candidates i ∈ C A and all values k = 0, . . . , a − 1, with high probability, for all i and k, the fraction of voters (in A) ranking i in position k is at most α · 2 a . Because the total fraction of voters in A is α, any excess votes for some (early) positions k must be compensated by fewer votes for other (late) positions k ′ . Relaxing the constraint that the number of votes for each position k must be non-negative, we can upper-bound the total points for i by assuming that each of the positions k = 0, . . . , a − 2 receives twice the expected number of votes, while position k = a−1 receives a negative number of votes that compensates for the excess votes. Then, the advantage for i over ı from votes from A is at most
Finally, we can bound
Def. of α
Thus, ı beats all candidates drawn from A, and the winner will be from B.
Using the preceding lemmas, the proof of necessity is almost complete. Consider the metric space with all the parameters as defined above. By Lemmas 3.8 and 3.9, with probability at least 1 2 , the winner is from B. The social cost of any candidate from B is at least β · 0 + (1 − β) · (s + 1). On the other hand, the social cost of any candidate from A is at most (1 − β) · 2 + β · (s + 1) = 3. The distortion in this case is thus at least
In the other case (when E does not occur -this happens with probability at most 1 2 ), the distortion is at least 1, so that the expected distortion is at least 
Proof of Corollary 3.2
Proof of Corollary 3.2. For the first part of the corollary, assume that g is not constant on (0, 1). The intuition is that in that case, the sum on the left-hand side of (4) (for sufficiently large y) will be Ω(n), while the sum on the right-hand side is obviously at most n. By making y a constant close enough to 1, we can dominate the constant from Ω, and thus ensure that the inequality (4) holds. Then, the constant distortion follows from Theorem 3.1.
More precisely, let 0 < ℓ < u < 1 be such that g(ℓ) > g(u). Let δ := g(ℓ) − g(u) and y := max(u, 1 − δℓ 8 ) ∈ (0, 1). Let n 0 be such that for all n ≥ n 0 , we have
Such an n 0 exists by the consistency of V and basic integer arithmetic. Then, for all n ≥ n 0 ,
Because the condition (4) is satisfied, Theorem 3.1 implies constant distortion.
For the second part of the corollary, assume that g(x) = c < 1 for all x ∈ (0, 1). Let y ∈ (0, 1) be arbitrary. We will show that for sufficiently large n, the condition (4) is violated.
The intuition is that the sum on the right-hand side of (4) consists of terms that will in the limit be 1 − c > 0, while the left-hand side is a sum in which each term converges to 0. Thus, never mind how large the constant y < 1 is, the factors of y and 1 − y will eventually not be enough to make the left-hand side larger than the right-hand side. Making this intuition precise requires some care: while the functions g n converge to g, we did not assume that they do so uniformly. To deal with this issue, we will consider consistency with g at two points γ and 1 − γ only (with γ being a very small constant), and use monotonicity of each g n to bound the remaining terms. The terms of the sum corresponding to points to the left of γ and to the right of 1 − γ can then not be bounded, but there are few enough of them that we still obtain the desired inequality. More specifically, let γ ∈ (0, 1) be a sufficiently small constant such that γ < min(y, 1 − y) and
Such a γ exists, since both the numerator and denominator tend to strictly positive numbers as γ → 0. Recall that g(x) = c for all x ∈ (0, 1). Let n 0 be such that for all n ≥ n 0 , g n (⌊γ · (n − 1)⌋) ≤ g n (⌈ γ 2 · (n − 1)⌉) ≤ c + δ, g n (⌈(1 − γ)(n − 1)⌉) ≥ g n (⌊(1 − γ 2 )(n − 1)⌋) ≥ c − δ, ⌈y · (n − 1)⌉ − ⌊γ · (n − 1)⌋ ≤ 2(y − γ)(n − 1).
Such an n 0 exists by basic integer arithmetic and the consistency of V applied at x = γ/2 and x = 1 − γ/2. The first inequality uses y < 1 − γ and the monotonicity of g n , and the second inequality uses the bounds obtained from consistency of g n with respect to g. To bound the right-hand side of (4) The first inequality again used monotonicity of g n , and the second used the bounds obtained from the consistency of g n with respect to g. Canceling the common term y(n − 1) between the left-hand side and right-hand side, the right-hand side of (4) is at least as large as the left-hand side whenever (1 − y) · (1 − c − δ) ≥ γ + (y − γ) · 4δ. Solving for δ, this is equivalent to
which is exactly ensured by our choice of γ and δ. This completes the proof.
Conclusions
When candidates are drawn i.i.d. from the voter distribution, we showed that whether a positional voting system V has expected constant distortion can be almost fully characterized by its limiting behavior. In particular, if the limiting scoring rule is not constant on (0, 1), then V has constant expected distortion; if the limiting scoring rule is a constant other than 1 on (0, 1), then V has superconstant expected distortion. A more subtle condition depending on the "rate of convergence" to the limit rule completes the characterization. Our Theorem 3.1 currently does not characterize the order of growth of the distortion. With some effort, the proof could likely be adapted to the case where the y in the theorem is a function y(n), which would allow us to characterize the rate at which the distortion grows with n.
For specific voting systems, the proof of Theorem 3.1 can often be adapted to give tighter bounds. For example, straightforward modifications of the proof can be used to show that the distortion of k-approval or k-veto (where each voter can veto k candidates) for constant k grow as Ω(n). This matches the O(n) upper bound from Lemma 3.3, giving a tight analysis of the distortion of these voting systems. Similarly, the sufficiency proof can be adapted to show that the distortion of Borda Count is at most 16, for all metric spaces and all n. When the number of candidates grows large enough, the expected distortion is in fact bounded by 10.
Our results indicate that if one is concerned about systematic, and possibly adversarial, bias in which candidates run for office, randomizing the slate of candidates may be part of a solution approach. Such an approach can be considered as a step in the direction of lottocracy and sortition [14, 20, 21] , in which office holders are directly chosen at random from the population. Pure lottocracy does well in terms of representativeness of office holders, but one of its main drawbacks is the potential lack of competency. As a broader direction for future research, our work here suggests devising models that capture the tension between these two objectives, and would allow for the design of hybrid mechanisms that navigate the tradeoff successfully.
